Quick takes

Metaculus is excited to announce the winners of the inaugural Keep Virginia Safe Tournament! This first-of-its kind collaboration with the University of Virginia (UVA) Biocomplexity Institute and the Virginia Department of Health (VDH) delivered forecasting and modeling resources to public health professionals and public policy experts as they have navigated critical decisions on COVID-19. Congratulations to the top 3 prize winners! 1. Sergio  2. 2e10e122 3. mattvdm Thank you to forecasting community! Your predictions were integrated into VDH planning sessions and were shared with local health department staff, statewide epidemiologists, and even with the Virginia Governor’s office. For more details on the tournament outcomes, visit the project summary. Our successful partnership with UVA and VDH continues through the Keep Virginia Safe II Tournament, where Metaculus forecasts continue to provide valuable information. Join to help protect Virginians and compete for $20,000 in prizes.  Find more information about the Keep Virginia Safe Tournament, including the complete leaderboard, here.

Destroying viruses in at-risk labs Thanks to Garrett Ehinger for feedback and for writing the last paragraph. Military conflict around or in the vicinity of biological research laboratories could substantially increase the risk of releasing a dangerous pathogen into the environment. The fighting and mass movement of refugees combine with other risk factors to magnify the potential ramifications of this risk.  Garrett Ehinger elaborates on this issue in his excellent Chicago Tribune piece, and proposes the creation of nonaggression treaties for biological labs in war zones as additional pillars to shore up biosecurity norms.  This seems like a great option, but I think there may be a more prompt technical solution as well.  Viruses, bacteria, and other dangerous materials in at-risk labs could be stored in containers that have built-in methods to destroy their contents. A strong heating element could be integrated into the storage compartment of each virus and activated by scientists at the lab if a threat seems imminent.  Vibration sensors could also automatically activate the system in case of a bombing or an earthquake.  This solution would require funding and engineering expertise.  I don’t know how much convincing labs would need to integrate it into their existing setups. If labs might consider the purchase and implementation of entirely new heating elements with their existing containers to be too tall of an order, there are other alternatives.  For example, “autoclaves” (the chemist's equivalent of a ceramic kiln or furnace) are already commonplace in many biological laboratories for purposes such as medium synthesis or equipment sterilization.  There could be value for these labs in developing SOPs and recommendations for the safe disposal of risky pathogens via autoclaves.  This solution would be quicker and easier to implement, but in an emergency situation, could require slightly more time to safely destroy all the lab’s pathogens.

Read a great blog article on how much biotechnology has developed over the years, the role it plays in global health, and how it might continue to improve our lives. Unsure what the norms are around reposting another's blog (I have no connection to the authors), so I'll simply share the link. "Reasons to Be Grateful for Biotechnology", by Niko McCarty and Avadhoot.

Could the latent effects of Covid worsen AI alignment efforts and/or other x-risk responses? This is very much a 'I suspect (and hope) I'm wrong' question, but I thought it was still worth checking the rationale for this not being seen as a major issue. Essentially, is it likely that the long-term and latent effects of Covid on cognitive performance could significantly damage global responses to x-risks? With a studies finding cognitive decline and brain shrinkage after even mild Covid infections (with IQ drops higher than stroke patients in some severe cases) and Omicron variants, though less deadly, apparently still causing greater brain apoptosis (of many previously healthy cells) than previous variants, is it possible that mass infection could be causing some level of general cognitive decline? Or, if this is happening, to some extent, to most people, with mass infection, are we not even noticing the extent of this decline? If so, even if this is a pretty small or even negligible decline in most cases, if the raw ability to handle cognitive complexity is an important aspect of making effective political decisions, could small (and therefore particularly unnoticed) but en masse cognitive declines be enough to negatively tip the balance in responses to existing x-risks? Add in potential further declines from repeat infections and cumulative damage, and might key political decision-makers have unrecognised, biologically worsened responses to AI policy during a crucial period for the field?  Equally, could this affect responses to other, perhaps previously more manageable risks? E.g. for nuclear risks, with admittedly arbitrary numbers, if each year has a 1% pre-Covid risk of nuclear war, if Covid-related cognitive decline shifted this risk to even something like 1.1% per year, even small risk increases could still be significant for such a strong potential negative.  Counterpoints As potential counterpoints, perhaps Covid-related cognitive decline just isn't