By Timothy R. Heath, senior international and defense researcher for the RAND Corporation, published in War on the Rocks, Dec. 14, 2022.
"...[I]n the past year, three pieces of evidence have, for many, dramatically elevated the likelihood of war. The first consists of intelligence reports regarding the preparation of Chinese military options for Taiwan by 2027. The second consists of statements by senior officials that stress the imperative of unification. The third consists of growing Chinese military advantage over U.S. forces near Taiwan.
Although the collective evidence appears persuasive, a closer examination shows that their significance has been seriously overstated. Moreover, there is a conspicuous lack of evidence that the government has decided to pursue a military solution to the island. China might someday choose to attack the island, but the most compelling evidence of that possibility would consist of indications that the government had prioritized Taiwan unification above other policy goals. The United States should continue to maintain its deterrence posture but refrain from overstating the threat and thereby misjudge the cross-strait situation."
Three arguments in favor of war soon:
Does this mean one should reduce the expected risk for the cross-strait? I don't think so. While there is no evidence of an imminent attack, it is abundantly clear that the Chinese government would like to have the option of a successful attack at will, to strike at the most politically convenient time. Anyone who examines cross-strait relations from the perspective of imminence (i.e. is there going to be an attack this week, next month or next year) is mistaken in perspective. It could be five years, ten years, or 50 years. Or it could be a random soldier firing shots next week and dragging the whole world into a world war. Effective guarding against nuclear risks does not occur with an accurate expected risk timeline (impossible given the extreme opaqueness of information and randomness of war events). Instead, it happens with constant, careful, vigilant guarding. Of course, we should avoid having the US government kick-starting a nuclear war by pre-emptive strikes or panic-induced miscalculations, but that is different from saying, 'China won't bomb TW next week so let's calm down'. I don't think this is the right sentiment here.
To my mind, the piece is a welcome response to the recent (imo) irresponsible hyping of cross-strait risk by influential US actors. To the extent that anyone's expectation of the risk of cross-strait violence was influenced by such voices, this piece should help recalibrate down. But of course the fundamental risk remains, even if there are reasons to doubt its immimence as represented by China hawks.
You could do a Straussian reading of this piece such that it is in fact saying 'China won't bomb TW next week so let's calm down' in order to "avoid having the US government kick-starting a nuclear war by pre-emptive strikes or panic-induced miscalculations." To the extent that Tim Heath is respected and that WotR is widely read by US decision-makers, I think this reading makes some sense (although ofc there are very strong incentives for the US gov't to not start a war with China that have nothing to do with whether they're reading WotR or not). Your mileage may vary.
Your broader point, though, that we should take a longer/less-temporally-bound/more structural view of the risk, is one that I agree with.
John Culver's How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan is also worth reading.
An all-out invasion would be detected months in advance: