In my personal view, there was a tremendous failure to capitalize on the crisis by global health security organizations, which were focused on stopping spread, but waited until around mid 2021 to start looking past COVID. This was largely a capacity issue, but it was also a strategic failure, and by the time anyone was seriously looking at things like the pandemic treaty, the window had closed.

I think this is definitely an interesting question, and I can see how it has some strategic value for organisations doing scenario planning for the future. 

As far as I'm aware (based on conversations with people closer to US government than me) there was an element of "pandemic fatigue" in US government. The government was painfully aware that they had spent a huge amount on COVID already. Proposals to spend even more on an "Apollo programme" or other efforts to ensure we don't have this problem again didn't seem appealing, because some many other priorities had been put on hold and were vying for attention.

I don't remember hearing much about polarisation being an important driver.

Great question! It seems like a mix of factors—polarization, fatigue from the prolonged crisis, and a tendency to move on once immediate danger fades. Many also see it as a 'one-off' rather than a broader warning. Survey research could be valuable in understanding public perception and how it applies to future risks like biorisk and AI safety.