I am a big fan of Peirce but less keen on James and subsequent pragmatists who took the movement in a direction closer to James's views. Peirce, for instance, does hold a correspondence theory of truth. He just also cashes it out in a "third level" of clarity, in which truth is what we would all agree upon a hypothetical "end of inquiry" in which there is no longer any uncertainty. I prefer Peirce's views because he is a realist about just about everything and sought to make philosophy more scientific (but not scientistic). For instance, he believes we can obtain capital-T truth but that our evidence is always fallible. What makes it a "pragmatic" view is that concepts are defined by their empirical consequences under particular circumstances, and that invalid/poorly-thought-out concepts do not well-specified empirical consequences.  In my view this is more compatible with EA than Rorty- or James-type views because on the Peircean view there is a fact of the matter about, say, a given species' sentience or lack thereof that we can at least get fallible evidence about. For James, and especially Rorty, the question of whether a given species is sentient would be more like a sociological phenomena-- we "understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation."  I think part of what EA is about is that we want to actually make a difference, merely appearing well-justified about whether we are making a big difference is not of interest. Indeed, a distinctive aspect of the EA community seems to be an obsession with figuring out whether the entire community might collectively be wrong about something; I'm not sure how to reconcile this practice with "defending against all comers" if your conversation peers are already on the same page as you.

However, I would be very interested to hear what attracted you to Rorty or papers by him you think would be good to check out that could be particularly relevant to EA. When I took a class in pragmatism my professor was a big critic of Rorty so it is possible that I have unfairly dismissed him. It's also been several years since I studied the movement closely. 

James does some have interesting speculations about the origins of morality (https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/intejethi.1.3.2375309). Explicit discussions of morality are pretty absent from Peirce to my knowledge, so he would be more likely relevant to EA for his contributions to philosophy of science.

Could you clarify if you have in mind any other characteristics that determine whether someone is or isn't a philosophical pragmatist aside from "[believing] that we can reason our way toward capital-T Truth"? Although I've encountered discussions of philosophical pragmatism before, it's definitely not my area of expertise. Additionally, I've not had this conversation about philosophical pragmatism with many EAs. 

That being said, I think it's reasonable to say that many if not most EAs probably believe "objectively verifiable 'Truth' is not attainable (but that doesn't mean nothing matters or nothing is actually True)." It's possible I'm slightly biased by my own beliefs, but in my experience such a point seems fairly non-controversial among thoughtful people: there are a lot of wrong ways to interpret the claim (e.g., "Truth is subjective")—including bad assumptions regarding the implications for action and thought (e.g., "it's impossible to reason about anything")—but once you peel away the poor interpretations and highlight basic examples like "we can't verify whether there is a demon tricking us all into thinking 2+2=4; we can't verify that we don't exist in a simulated reality with fake laws of logic", most (thoughtful/non-offended) people will admit "okay, maybe we can't be 100% certain about anything, but it's still pretty close to 100% and those hypotheticals shouldn't really influence our actions."