Some general thoughts I have on reading this post. I feel it's worth mentioning that I use a stark example to illustrate my point and do so in the hope that nobody is offended (as that isn't my intention).
I support moral trade, but find it hard to set aside a low level of suspicion/uncertainty I feel when people advance this argument.
Imagine a person who claims "I love humans and think they're great, but I also really enjoy torturing and even raping them. I recognise that this causes harm to them, but over my lifetime, I'll probably only torture and rape about 20 people. However, I have found this charity that would offset the harm of doing so by preventing torture and rape of humans. A donation of about $1000 would offset the harm I intend to do over my lifetime. Therefore, if I will not forgo my urges to torture and rape humans, but earn-to-give and donate to this charity. After all, I believe in EV maximisation, not deontological constraints."
The bottom line might be positive expected utility, but something in the refusal to abandon one's own personal convenience or constrain a darker urge (in the case of your post, liking the taste of meat since I'm assuming this isn't health related) leaves me suspicious.
I claim that the person should resist the urge to torture and rape humans as a starting point.
As a side note, I sometimes wonder if vegans have diminished sensitivity to taste, making veganism easier by reducing the urge to eat meat
When you purchase meat, the harm unfolds as follows: A farm reviews the previous year's demand and decides to expand operations to supply another 1,000 chickens. Of course, this decision typically occurs for every 1,000th chicken sold. This level of indirectness feels similar to the harm caused by emitting CO₂ during a commute. For instance, my emissions might exacerbate a flood by 0.1% twenty years later, leading to one extra death for every 1,000 commutes on average.
This argument presupposes that the value of being vegan is measured only in animals directly saved from the act of a given vegan not eating them. It ignores the (difficult to quantify) gains from establishing veganism as of a social norm, creating demand for alt proteins, demonstrating the viability of living healthily as a vegan and so on.
It also neglects the lose of credibility incurred by eating animals. Imagine if our person from the previous example began advocating for women's rights. Virtually nobody would take them seriously. They might even end up doing more damage to this cause, despite their protest, "my actions are in fact positive EV". Even if we assume this claim is true, there is something dubious about such a person. I'm being unfair by not elucidating exactly what it is, but the best I can think of right now is to gesture at the mismatch between the person's system 1 and system 2.
It's harder to take someone seriously on the plight of animals when they themselves are eating one, as it is harder to take a slave owner seriously on the plight of slaves while they are actively depriving someone of their freedom.
Some general thoughts I have on reading this post. I feel it's worth mentioning that I use a stark example to illustrate my point and do so in the hope that nobody is offended (as that isn't my intention).
I support moral trade, but find it hard to set aside a low level of suspicion/uncertainty I feel when people advance this argument.
Imagine a person who claims "I love humans and think they're great, but I also really enjoy torturing and even raping them. I recognise that this causes harm to them, but over my lifetime, I'll probably only torture and rape about 20 people. However, I have found this charity that would offset the harm of doing so by preventing torture and rape of humans. A donation of about $1000 would offset the harm I intend to do over my lifetime. Therefore, if I will not forgo my urges to torture and rape humans, but earn-to-give and donate to this charity. After all, I believe in EV maximisation, not deontological constraints."
The bottom line might be positive expected utility, but something in the refusal to abandon one's own personal convenience or constrain a darker urge (in the case of your post, liking the taste of meat since I'm assuming this isn't health related) leaves me suspicious.
I claim that the person should resist the urge to torture and rape humans as a starting point.
This argument presupposes that the value of being vegan is measured only in animals directly saved from the act of a given vegan not eating them. It ignores the (difficult to quantify) gains from establishing veganism as of a social norm, creating demand for alt proteins, demonstrating the viability of living healthily as a vegan and so on.
It also neglects the lose of credibility incurred by eating animals. Imagine if our person from the previous example began advocating for women's rights. Virtually nobody would take them seriously. They might even end up doing more damage to this cause, despite their protest, "my actions are in fact positive EV". Even if we assume this claim is true, there is something dubious about such a person. I'm being unfair by not elucidating exactly what it is, but the best I can think of right now is to gesture at the mismatch between the person's system 1 and system 2.
It's harder to take someone seriously on the plight of animals when they themselves are eating one, as it is harder to take a slave owner seriously on the plight of slaves while they are actively depriving someone of their freedom.