I've just made a correction to the table here. I had previously copy-pasted the wrong values, meaning that the column "Mean negotiating time" had the values for the maximum (rather than mean) time that it took to get an agreement for each reference class. Sorry for the error.
Thank you very much for writing this. I broadly agree with your post, but I probably put less weight than you do on the historical record. I think the crux is that I assign a higher probability to there being close calls that we don’t yet know about, but which would make the picture look very different.[1] Here are a few reasons for thinking this:
This depends upon the claim that the cases that we know about are not necessarily representative of the entire universe of cases.
A similar point is made in this report from Chatham House (p3).
Sagan is interested in a broader range of close calls than the one in the post, but from memory I think Sagan was the first researcher to publicly identify the “Missiles over Georgia” and “power outage” cases.
Sagan also did interviews with relevant people, and submitted requests under the Freedom of Information Act. These are described in the introduction to Limits of Safety.
USSR/Russia: Petrov, Able Archer, Norwegian Rocket. USSR and USA: Cuban Missile Crisis. USA: remaining 6.
This reading list is an excellent place to start for getting a sense of China x AI (though it doesn't have that much about China's political objectives in general).