I research a wide variety of issues relevant to global health and development. I also consult as a researcher for GiveWell (but nothing I say on the Forum is ever representative of GiveWell). I'm always happy to chat - if you think we have similar interests and would like to talk, send me a calendar invite at karthikt@berkeley.edu!
I'm referring to why it doesn't get brought up by the opposers of Trump tariffs, who clearly do not think that trade is zero sum (unless they somehow think that tariffs benefit foreigners and hurt Americans). The liberal American opposition to tariffs is totally silent on their effects abroad.
Tariffs on manufactured goods are likely incident on manufacturing workers, which is a way in which they can increase poverty, though probably not extreme $1/day poverty. Regardless the general point goes through, that they will reduce the incomes of a generally not-well-off group of people.
Love this analysis and I've been wondering why no one talks about it. There are two motivations that makes sense to me for why analysts don't talk about this:
It bothers me to not be able to distinguish between these.
If you haven't read it, this article is a convincing argument for why containing harmful policies by the West should be a main focus for development policy.
Shooting from the hip here - if the future of AI progress is inference-time scaling, that seems inherently "safer"/less prone to power-seeking. Expensive inference means that a model is harder to reproduce (e.g. can't just upload itself somewhere else, because without heavy compute its new version is relatively impotent) and harder for rogue actors to exploit (since they will also need to secure compute for every action they make it do).
If this is true, it suggests that AI safety could be advanced by capabilities research into AI architecture that can be more powerful yet also more constrained in individual computations. So is it true?
Merely subsidizing nets, as opposed to free distribution, used to be a much more popular idea. My understanding is that that model was nuked by this paper showing that demand for nets falls discontinuously at any positive price (60 percentage points reduction in demand when going from 100% subsidy to 90% subsidy). So unless people's value for their children's lives are implausibly low, people are making mistakes in their choice of whether or not to purchase a bednet.
New Incentives, another GiveWell top charity, can move people to vaccinate their children with very small cash transfers (I think $10). The fact that $10 can mean the difference between whether people protect their children from life threatening diseases or not is crazy if you think about it.
This is not a rare finding. This paper found very low household willingness to pay for cleaning up contaminated wells, which cause childhood diarrhea and thus death. Their estimates imply that households in rural Kenya are willing to pay at most $770 to prevent their child's death, which just doesn't seem plausible. Ergo, another setting where people are making mistakes. Another; demand for motorcycle helmets is stupidly low and implies that Nairobi residents value a statistical life at $220, less than 10% of annual income. Unless people would actually rather die than give up 10% of their income for a year, this is clearly another case where people's decisions do not reflect their true value.
This is not that surprising if you think about it. People in rich countries and poor countries alike are really bad at investing in preventative health. Each year I dillydally on getting the flu vaccine, even though I know the benefits are way higher than the costs, because I don't want to make the trip to CVS (an hour out of my day, max). My friend doesn't wear a helmet when cycling, even at night or in the rain, because he finds it inconvenient. Most of our better health in the rich world doesn't come from us actively making better health decisions, but from our environment enabling us to not need to make health decisions at all.
there's a difference between choosing to ignore the Drowning Child because there are even more children in the next pond over, and ignoring the drowning children entirely because they might grow up to do bad things.
This is a fantastic summary of why I feel much more averse to this argument than to statements like "animal welfare is more important than human welfare" (which I am neutral-to-positive on).
Apt time to plug an analysis I did a while ago of paying farmers in India not to burn their crop stubble. It's primarily a (pretty effective) air quality intervention, but I pulled together some numbers that suggest it also averts GHGs at $36/ton of CO2e, which would probably satisfy a lot of climate funders!