Thanks for your response. It seems we disagree on much less than I had initially assumed. My response was mostly intended for someone who has prematurely become a nihilist (as apparently happened to one of Carlsmith’s friends), whereas you remain committed to doing the most good. And I was mainly addressing the last flavour of objection you mention.

I respectfully disagree. Firstly, that is by no means the last word on infinite ethics (see papers by Manheim and Sandberg, and a more recent paper out of the Global Priorities Institute). Prematurely abandoning utilitarianism because of infinites is a bit like (obviously the analogy is not perfect) abandoning the general theory of relativity because it can’t deal with infinities.

Secondly, we should act as if we are in a finite world: it would be seen as terribly callous of someone not to have relieved the suffering of others if it turned out we were in a finite universe all along. It is telling that virtually no one has substantively changed their actions as a result of infinite ethics. This is sensible and prudent.

Thirdly, in an infinite world, we should understand that utilitarianism is not about maximising some abstract utility function or number in the sky, but about improving the conscious experiences of sentient beings. Infinities don’t change the fact that I can reduce the suffering of the person in front of me, or the sentient being on the other side of the world, or the fact that this is good for them. And there are good practical, utilitarian reasons not to spend one’s time focusing on other potential worlds.

That’s a pretty impressive and thorough piece of research, regardless of whether you agree with the conclusions. I think one of its central points — that x-risk/longtermism has always been a core part of the movement — is correct. Some recent critiques have overemphasised the degree to which EA has shifted toward these areas in the last few years. It was always, if not front and centre, ‘hiding in plain sight’. And there was criticism of EA for focusing on x-risk from very early on (though it was mostly drowned out by criticisms of EA’s global health work, which now seems less controversial along with some of the farmed animal welfare work being done).

If someone disagrees empirically with estimates of existential risk, or holds a person-affecting view of population ethics, the idea that it is a front for longtermism is a legitimate criticism to make of EA. Even more resources could be directed toward global health if it wasn’t for these other cause areas. A bit less reasonably, people who hold non-utilitarian beliefs might even suspect that EA was just a way of rebranding ‘total utilitarianism’ (with the ‘total’ part becoming slowly more prominent over time).

At the same time, EAs still do a lot in the global health space (where a majority of EA funding is still directed), so the movement is in a sense being condemned because it has actually noticed these problems (see the Copenhagen Interpretation of Ethics).

This isn’t to say that the paper itself is criticising EA (it seems to be more of a qualitative study of the movement).

And that goes in both directions: some find it intuitively unreasonable to think that humans can realise far more welfare than some other animals. Additionally, the undiluted experience model seems pretty intuitive to many.

I would hope that in a community committed to impartiality, one need not have to make the case for why it’s worth caring about the welfare of beings that happen not to be members of our species, so it is totally fine not to include that in your post.

I’ll have a look, thanks! I do tend to be quite sceptical of this research due to the replication crisis and I’m not sure how useful it is. The same was true with Heinrich’s questionable “WEIRD” book. The common factor linking people whose parents/families object to them becoming vegetarian isn’t being Eastern/Western or Asian/Western, but “having families who object to vegetarianism”. This post uses a personal anecdote and those of two other people raised in East Asian households to speak on behalf of every single Asian on the planet — “those of us brought up in Asian households” apparently find these issues “particularly challenging”.

On a population scale, there are of course behavioural and ideological differences on average. And this can inform population-level policies and strategies, to some extent. Farmed animal welfare charities might use this information to tailor their messages to audiences in different countries, for example. But applying population averages to individuals is not good practice.

That display seems to illustrate my point — that the West/East distinction is a bit odd and rather outdated — well! People in cities in Brazil, Costa Rica, Malawi, India and China were more helpful than people in the United States, the Netherlands, Italy and Israel. But also, people in Vienna, Madrid and Copenhagen were more helpful than people in other parts of Europe, while people in Shanghai were more helpful than people in Taipei, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.

Why many EAs are so eager to make broad, hasty generalisations about entire continents and hemispheres is something I’ve never understood.

Yes, I probably should have mentioned Hinduism too, because that is after all what explains the prevalence of vegetarianism in India.

I do again agree that the East doesn’t take EA ideas well. But neither, unfortunately, does the West, despite being much wealthier and better educated on average. Even people within the existing community find it difficult to commit to impartiality.

Thank you for this post. I agree that EA’s moral roots are very weird to almost everyone, but it’s for that reason that I’m unclear why the “Western-Eastern” dichotomy needed to be invoked? I imagine vegetarianism has been poorly received by many Western parents/families too.

Many of the philosophical ideas that underpin EA are also very close to those found in some “Eastern/Asian” traditions, including Mohism, Buddhism and Jainism (edit: and Hinduism). Asia probably had the first recorded consequentialist (Mozi, in China), the first recorded utilitarian (Santideva, in India) and the first recorded vegan (al-Ma'arri, in Syria) in history. And estimates vary, but India probably has the highest prevalence of vegetarianism in the world?

The distinction between philosophers and animal activists might be relevant. For instance, his name was also listed last on a 2007 book he co-edited with two woman philosophers (Lori Gruen and Laura Grabel). In contrast, he was listed first on a 2006 book he co-authored with animal activist Jim Mason (a man). But the claim that he “appropriates” people’s voices is unsubstantiated, never mind the stronger claim that he appropriates some people’s voices simply because they are women.

The claim that Professor Singer appropriates women’s voices because his name appeared first on a couple of bylines seems belied by the fact that Helga Kuhse and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek (both women co-authors of his, in the 20th and 21st Century respectively) are listed first on all of the books they’ve written with him as far as I can tell. In his recent interview with Tyler Cowen, he assiduously mentioned Lazari-Radek whenever his work with her was mentioned.