Aspiring suffering-reducer and empirical AGI safety researcher from Hong Kong. Often daydreaming about consciousness. Some preference for traditional liberalism.
I like to learn. My main intellectual influences/'first contact'/'impact on salient parts of mind': Tomasik/2016/90%, Haidt/2022/70%, Schopenhauer/2015/40%, Dawkins/2010-11/40%, Jesus/1999/10%
Another relevant article on "machine psychology" https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.13988 (interestingly, it's by a co-author of Peter Singer's first AI paper)
You seem to have written against proposing norms in the past. So apologies for my mistake and I'm glad that's not your intention.
To be clear, I think we should be free to write as we wish. Regardless, it still seems to me that voicing support for an already quite popular position on restricting expression comes with the risk of strengthening associated norms and bringing about the multiple downsides I mentioned.
Among the downsides, yes, the worry that strengthening strong norms dealing with 'offensive' expression can lead to unfair punishments. This is not a baseless fear. There are historical examples of norms on restricting expression leading to unfair punishments; strong religious and political norms have allowed religious inquisitors and political regimes to suppress dissenting voices.
I don't think EA is near the worst forms of it. In my previous comment, I was only pointing to a worrying trend towards that direction. We may (hopefully) never arrive at the destination. But along the way, there are more mild excesses. There have been a few instances where, I believe, the prevailing culture has resulted in disproportionate punishment either directly from the community or indirectly from external entities whose actions were, in part, enabled by the community's behavior. I probably won't discuss this too publicly but if necessary we can continue elsewhere.
It seems that you, correct me if I'm wrong, along with many who agree with you, are looking to further encourage a norm within this domain (on the basis of at least one example, i.e. the one example from the blog post, that challenged it).
This might benefit some individuals by reducing their emotional distress. But strengthening such a norm that already seems strong/largely uncontroversial/to a large extent popular in the context of this community, especially one within this domain, makes me concerned in several ways:
I'd be less worried (and possibly find it good) if such a norm was strengthened in a context where it isn't strong, which gives us more indication that the changes are net positive. However, it's evident that a large number of individuals here already endorse some version of this norm, and it is quite influential. Enthusiasm could easily become excessive. I sincerely doubt most people intend to bring about draconian restrictions/punishments (on this or something else), but those consequences can gradually appear despite that.
FWIW, Brian Tomasik does a fuzzies/utilons split thing too. One justification is that it helps avoid cognitive dissonance between near-term causes and, in his mind, more effective longtermist causes.
My position, in contrast, is that I acknowledge the epistemic force of far-future arguments but maintain some commitment to short-term helping as an intrinsic spiritual impulse. Along the lines of Occam's imaginary razor, this allows me to avoid distorting my beliefs about the far-future question based on emotional pulls to stop torture-level suffering in the present. In the face of emotion-based cognitive dissonance, it's often better to change your values than to change your beliefs.
It might be overly confusing to call it "changing [my ideal] values". It's more that I have preferences for both. Some that seem like ones I would ideally like to keep (minimizing suffering in expectation), but some that as a human, for better or worse, I have (drives to reduce suffering in front of me, sticking to certain principles...).
If the price of a split in donations/personal focus results in me becoming more effective at the far-future stuff that I think is more important for utilons, in a way that makes those utilons go up, then that seems worth it.
Yeah, in a scenario with "nation-controlled" AGI, it's hard to see people from the non-victor sides not ending up (at least) as second-class citizens - for a long time. The fear/lack of guarantee of not ending up like this makes cooperation on safety more difficult, and the fear also kind of makes sense? Great if governance people manage to find a way to alleviate that fear - if it's even possible. Heck, even allies of the leading state might be worried - doesn't feel too good to end up as a vassal state. (Added later (2023-06-02): It may be a question that comes up as AGI discussions become mainstream.)
Wouldn't rule out both American and Chinese outside of respective allied territory being caught in the crossfire of a US-China AI race.
Political polarization on both sides in the US is also very scary.
I generally agree with the meritocratic perspective. It seems a good way (maybe the best?) to avoid tit-for-tat cycles of "those holding views popular in some context abuse power -> those who don't like the fact that power was abused retaliate in other contexts -> in those other contexts, holding those views results in being harmed by people in those other contexts who abuse power".
Good point about the priors. Strong priors about these things seem linked to seeing groups as monoliths with little within-group variance in ability. Accounting for the size of variance seems under-appreciated in general. E.g., if you've attended multiple universities, you might notice that there's a lot of overlap between people's "impressiveness", despite differences in official university rankings. People could try to be less confused by thinking in terms of mean/median, variance, and distributions of ability/traits more, rather than comparing groups by their point estimates.
Some counter-considerations:
But yeah, generally, sticking to the Schelling point of "don't discriminate by religion (or lack-thereof)" seems good. Also, if someone is religious and in EA (i.e., being in an environment that doesn't have too many people who think like them), it's probably good evidence that they really want to do good and are willing to cooperate with others to do so, despite being different in important ways. It seems a shame to lose them.
I've been doing a 1-year "conversion master's" in CS (I previously studied biochemistry). I took as many AI/ML electives as I'm permitted to/can handle, but I missed out on an intro to RL course. I'm planning to take some time to (semi-independently) up-skill in AI safety after graduating. This might involve some projects and some self-study.
It seems like a good idea to be somewhat knowledgeable on RL basics going forward. I've taken (paid) accredited, distance/online courses (with exams etc.) concurrently with my main degree and found them to be higher quality than common perception suggests - although it does feel slightly distracting to have more on my plate.
Is it worth doing a distance/online course in RL (e.g. https://online.stanford.edu/courses/xcs234-reinforcement-learning ) as one part of the up-skilling period following graduation? Besides the Stanford online one that I've linked, are there any others that might be high quality and worth looking into? Otherwise, are there other resources that might be good alternatives?
So in my comment I was only trying to say that the comment you responded to seemed to point to something true about the preferences of women in general vs. the preferences of women who are "highly educated urban professional-managerial class liberals in the developed world".
Such perspectives seem easy to miss for people (in general/of all genders, not just women) belonging to the elite U.S./U.S.-adjacent progressive class - a class that has disproportionate influence over other cultures, societies etc., which makes it seem worthwhile to discuss in spaces where many belong to this class.
About your other point, I guess I don't have much of an opinion on it (yet), but my initial impression is that it seems like openness comes in degrees. Compared to other movements, I also rarely observe 'EA' openly declaring itself hostile to something (e.g. "fraud is unacceptable" but there aren't really statements on socialism, conservatism, religions, culture...).
There might be differences between identifying with feminism and 'being open to scholars of feminism, queer studies and gender studies' though. Most Americans probably aren't familiar with academia to know of its latest thinking.
And like how different people have different notions of what counts as discriminatory, racist, sexist, or not discriminatory, racist, sexist, it's possible that different people have different notions of what 'feminism' means. (Some might consider it a position supporting equal rights between the sexes - others a position supporting women's rights. They might be thinking of the second, third, or fourth wave etc.)
The supplementary document containing the survey questions suggests the question asked was "How well, if at all, do each of the following describe you?" followed by "Environmentalist", "Feminist" and "A supporter of gun rights" (in random order), which doesn't seem to specify one specific notion of 'feminist' for survey participants to consider.
Although, to be fair, maybe there's actually more agreement among Americans on the definition of feminist (in the year of the survey, 2020) than I'm expecting.
In any case, I expect the differences in preferences of elite Anglosphere/U.S. women, and not-necessarily-elite, non-Anglosphere/non-U.S. women in general (e.g., in Europe, Asia, South America) would still be quite large.
Regarding the TCS PhD, is it possible to work on it remotely from London?