I think one factor that adds uncertainty to climate giving is that effective climate action requires systems change and innovation breakthroughs, and that you can't simply put a price tag on these two because advocacy and innovation can fail. A more bednet-style approach to climate giving, such as forest protection and reforestation, seems promising because it offers high certainty and hardly any political opposition. Even then, these direct interventions have all kinds of uncertainty related to permanence (will the forest be cut down again?), additionality (would the forest have regrown naturally?), and leakage (will people just cut down different trees?). Unlike in global health and development, directly tackling emissions in one place can increase it somewhere else.

Personally, I've come to terms with the idea that climate action is inherently uncertain. I can never pin down how my actions reduced global emissions because there's a high chance of failure. But if we pool the probability of the efforts of thousands of people, we can collectively say that we very likely made a big dent in emissions because we can spread the risk over many donors, activists, and professionals.

My intuition is the situation is different for larger organizations and donors who can afford to spread their bets and can do more to single-handedly galvanize an area of research or policy.

How would you feel about donating to a high-impact grantmaking funds that spreads their climate bets and works to advance entire areas or research and policies? If you donate to the Founders Pledge climate fund or the Giving Green fund, for example, your donations are pooled with those of hundreds to thousands of other people who collectively can spread their bets and build new areas or research and policy.

(PS. Setting up donations to funds instead of individual charities has some additional benefits. It helps to allocate funding to charities when they need it most, they can make grants to individual projects that don't need continuous funding, and funds can change their recipients if other charities become more effective. See the EE website.)

Thank you Trym!

Good point on the error sensitivity. The geometric mean penalizes low scores more so it increases the probability of a false negative/type II error: an alternative that should be prioritised is not prioritised.

Glad to hear!

@DLMRBN 🔸 and I write a monthly newsletter on climate action. Feel free to subscribe if you wanna read more!

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I like the idea of measuring or anticipating the effects of a tax in units of deaths avoided/caused and quality of life gained/lost instead of in monetary terms. The monetary measurement of the impacts of a tax (the common approach among economists) can be quite a bad proxy for actual things we care about: saving and improving lives. There's actually a growing field of economics aiming to replace the GDP measure with quality of life measurements. 

I understand your causal mechanism to be as follows: (1) taxation reduces people's income, (2) having less income makes working risky jobs financially more attractive, (3) this causes more people to die. While this sounds plausible, I see quite a few problems with the approach that you're suggesting, which I'll cover below. (I won't go in-depth into the calculation you used since you already mentioned that it's not accurate and I assume the point of your post is to advocate for starting a subdiscipline of economics, rather than providing a method for calculation.)

Use of VSL estimates

VSL estimates come from looking at the wage differences between similar jobs with different occupational fatality rates, for example lumberjacks and gardeners. In the USA, for every $13 million or so in increased wages among we-assume-otherwise-identical jobs, one person dies on the job. 

VSL estimates are intended be used to understand how people value small reductions in risk, not to predict the outcome of increased wages on deaths. Greater risk leads to higher pay, but higher pay doesn't lead to this increase in deaths per se. For example, demand for risky jobs like firefighters isn't very elastic (the number of firefighters society needs is more or less fixed), and even if that wasn't the case, less qualified or experienced people may enter the field. I wouldn't use the VSL for this purpose since the methods used to calculate it don't establish this causal link.

Not a lot of people die in workplace accidents

I don't think people taking riskier jobs, as the VSL approach would assume, is the primary negative impact of taxation. Rather, I think reducing people's spendable income makes them less likely to buy healthy food, less likely to live in air-conditioned or heated houses, and less likely to be able to afford medical bills. Only a very small number of people actually die in accidents - let alone workplace accidents. So if we want to know the mortality effect of a tax, it would be more interesting to research questions such as: what is the effect of this tax on cardiovascular health (e.g. unable to buy healthy food) or lung health (e.g. air pollution). 

Taxation is used to reduce mortality

If it is not obvious to you that these numbers are all more than zero, consider the basic facts that poverty kills people, and taxes take money from people.

Interestingly, having low income, low wealth, low education, and low social status are very strong determinants of early mortality. This is exactly what taxation is trying to tackle. If we take the data for my country (The Netherlands), for example, we see that more than half of all public spending goes to healthcare and social security, and another 12% goes to education. In short, taxation is mostly used to make healthcare affordable or to alleviate social determinants of mortality. 

So no, I don't think we can assume that taxation kills people.

People in poverty are mostly exempt from taxes

poverty kills people, and taxes take money from people

Looking at distributive effects is probably really important here. I can imagine that taxing people to the point that they enter poverty (as you suggested) makes things a lot worse for them. Most countries have some type of tax-free threshold under which you don't have to pay income taxes. Low incomes are only taxed relatively little. Some taxes, like VAT on food, fall disproportionately on the poor since they spend a larger share of their income on food.

So, theoretically it's possible that taxation causes poverty, and poverty causes deaths. But if we look at the top causes of global poverty, we see that poverty is mostly caused by things we can tackle by spending tax money: on safety nets and food programmes to stop hunger, on healthcare systems to improve access, on sanitation and clean water to improve hygiene and save time, on education to give kids a prosperous future, on infrastructure so that people can get to work, on creating jobs...

Summary

In summary, I'm in favour of researching the effects of taxation and public spending on mortality, but I expect the sign on most taxes to be negative (i.e. reducing mortality), at least when the tax incidence is not on people in poverty and public funds are spent on sensible projects. I think the method based on the VSL is probably not appropriate, but your proposal to have a government consider the effects of mortality makes sense since we can probably make a good guesstimate of the effects of a tax or government programme on social determinants of mortality.

While many industrialized economies have a lower carbon intensity than a few decades ago, what matters for climate change is not carbon intensity, but total cumulative emissions. Carbon intensity is an often used metric, but it is flawed for achieving climate change goals.

This is what degrowth advocates point out: a relative decoupling between GDP and greenhouse gas emissions can still lead to an increase in total emissions if GDP grows faster than carbon intensity shrinks. Even though there has been a 34% decrease in carbon intensity (CO2e/$) between 1965 and 2015, total emissions increased by 300%. To decrease carbon emissions, we would either need to (a) have absolute and strong decoupling between emissions and GDP and/or (b) reduce society's dependence on GDP to flourish, at least temporarily. The former solution is often called 'ecomodernism', while the latter is 'degrowth' or 'post-growth'. (Background info on decoupling here.)

Obviously, degrowth approaches, too, can have their drawbacks (e.g. lower tax revenues, typically lower tractability). But I would keep away from calling degrowth a "non-starter" and use the scout mindset to explore ideas within it. Personally, I wouldn't support EA going all-in on the degrowth train, but there are probably worthwhile ideas and solutions coming from the degrowth economy that would otherwise be unlikely to get funding, as governments and companies have no incentive to advocate for degrowth. That's worthwhile to explore!

Remember that OP did not argue that EA climate change funding should all go to degrowth approaches, but merely for "further exploration and research as to it's [sic] viability as a funding opportunity". That seems like a fair idea to me.

I don't have a lot to add that hasn't been covered in the answers below. One thing I would add is: regardless of who owns the company, do you think that home batteries is the biggest impact you can make on climate change with your skillsets, or are there perhaps other fields that are working on climate solutions that score higher on importance, tractability and neglectedness. 

You could take a look at the Open Sustainable Technology list for inspiration on how programming can be impactful. Project Drawdown has a great list of impactful climate change interventions. If you have expertise on AI and machine learning, you can also check out Climate Change AI.