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Miles Kodama

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Here's one partial answer to your question. In Moral Uncertainty (pg 209), MacAskill et al. suggest that you can sometimes calibrate your confidence in a moral view using "induction from past experience." The more often that you (or other reasoners in your reference class) have changed your mind in the course of investigating a moral issue, the less confidence you should have in your current best guess answer. 

For example, perhaps you've spent a long time thinking about the ethics of letting a child drown in a shallow pond, and all along, you've never doubted that it's wrong. And perhaps you've also been thinking about whether it's categorically wrong to lie. Some days you're fully convinced by Kantian arguments for this view; other days you hear really convincing counterarguments, and you change your mind. Right now, you feel persuaded that lying is categorically wrong, but it nevertheless seems inappropriate for your credence on the wrongness of lying to vastly exceed your credence on the wrongness of letting a child drown.